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Women, Globalisation and civil society in the MENA 
area: Between marginalisation and radicalisation 
Leila Simona Talani 
 
Abstract 
This article analyses the condition of women in the MENA area in the light of 
the challenges faced by those countries within the context of globalisation. 
It will argue that, if the position of the MENA countries in the global political 
economy is increasingly marginalised, this is even truer for women, who are left 
behind in the process of up-skilling necessary to catch up with the increasing 
technological demands imposed by globalisation. 
Moreover, the crisis of the Arab State within globalisation seems to produce 
and increasing radicalisation of society, with all that this means in terms of further 
marginalisation of women. 
In this article a transnationalist conceptualisation of globalisation is adopted. 
 
Introduction 
This article analyses the condition of women in the MENA area in the light of 
the challenges faced by those countries within the context of globalisation. 
It will argue that, if the position of the MENA countries in the global political 
economy is increasingly marginalised, this is even truer for women, who are left 
behind in the process of up-skilling necessary to catch up with the increasing 
technological demands imposed by globalisation. 
Moreover, the crisis of the Arab State within globalisation seems to produce 
and increasing radicalisation of society, with all that this means in terms of further 
marginalisation of women. 
In this article a transnationalist conceptualisation of globalisation is adopted. 
This is particularly relevant if we consider that the definition of globalisation 
adopted here implies that it is a dynamic process, a sort of virtuous circle that once 
activated produces more and more integration. Indeed, a conceptualisation of 
globalisation resting on the central role played by technological development entails 
the need of a constant updating and re-qualification of skills for societies to keep up 
with scientific progress1. 
Societies failing to embark on this constant updating, although in absolute 
terms may gain some skills, are doomed to be progressively more and more 
marginalised from globalisation and therefore be more and more worse off. 
This poses the problem of the polarisation of wealth in both social and 
geographical terms. Those societies and societal strata who already have access to 
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educational and vocational systems and have the economic possibility of remaining 
in education for longer, if not to stay in education forever (the so called concept of 
the ‘knowledge society’), are in a much better position in the global political 
economy. On the contrary, the lower strata of society, as well as the weakest ones, 
like the elders or the women, and especially those living in marginalised countries, 
will be increasingly left aside by the fast moving world of the new skills necessary to 
keep up with globalisation. It follows that the social and geographical wealth gap is 
deemed to increase, leading to the paradox of ‘marginalisation within globalisation’. 
Indeed, as Mittleman puts it: 
 
‘The further away populations are from the global economy, whether in rich or 
poor countries, the worse they fare in terms of well-being, wealth and social 
protection. These divisions exist not only between states but also within states.’ 2. 
 
In light of this, the first section of this article is devoted to verifying the level of 
technological integration (or marginalisation) of the Arab world and the MENA 
countries in general, and of women within them in particular and their capacity to 
catch up with the skills necessary to gather the full benefits of globalisation. 
However, in the transnationalist perspective, the restructuring of production 
leading to flexible specialisation does not rely only on a change in the techno-
economic structure of a specific territory, but also implies cultural transformations 
affecting civil society3. Indeed, in the transnationalist conceptualisation, globalisation 
is a dialectical, dynamic process affecting civil society, transforming societal 
institutions and conducing to the establishment of the new social relations4. Thus, as 
Mittleman puts it: 
 
‘In so far as the flexible specialisation model as a productive system requires 
strong relations with civil society, socio-cultural institutions may represent either a 
constraining or a potentially enabling factor’5. 
 
It is therefore necessary to analyse also the evolution of civil society 
institutions and social capital in the MENA area to see how they have been modified 
by globalisation-induced economic restructuring and how women are integrated 
within them. This is the subject of the second section of this article. 
 
Technological marginalisation 
 
Technological innovation is integral to globalisation, especially new 
information technologies, transportation and communication. Although these are 
becoming spread around the globe, this does not happen evenly among regions and 
nations and therefore the scope for broadening global inequalities increases, instead 
of decreasing6. Furthermore, technological development has not been taking place 
completely by chance, but is itself a socially and institutionally embedded process 
which is much more likely to happen in those societies fostering it; it is therefore less 
likely to take place in countries that are already lagging behind (Dicken 2011:76). 
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Finally, the weaker strata of society are likely to be progressively weaker if they are 
unable to be integrated in the technological revolution implied by globalization. This 
is a typical self-reinforcing dynamic which leaves the losers further and further away. 
This is particularly true in the case of the Arab world where technological 
integration has been very weak in the last decades, especially with respect to 
women. For some scholars: 
 
‘The Arabs can be said to be suffering from technological anorexia; and they are 
disheartened because they are powerless. Arab analysts point to a state of paralysis 
on both the national and regional levels’ 7. 
 
Also according to the conclusions of the second Arab Human Development 
Report, completely dedicated to building a knowledge society, the situation of Arab 
technological production and expertise was dire8. 
In order to substantiate these considerations this section will first look at the 
technological sources of globalisation and then assess to what extent they have been 
achieved in the Arab world and, more specifically, by women 
The qualitative definition of globalisation adopted in this article relies on the 
assumption that the current phase of capitalist development is defined by some 
technological achievements that make it different from any other stages in the 
development of the world economy. In particular, scholars refer to the current phase 
as the early stages of the fifth Kondratiev wave (K-wave); a digital, information and 
communication technology one 9 . Each K-wave is characterised by various 
dimensions: the main ‘carrier’ branches, the infrastructure, the solutions offered to 
previous problems by the new techno-economic paradigms, the organisation of 
firms and forms of cooperation and competition, and, most importantly for our 
purposes, the geographical focus, which clearly does not include the MENA area10. In 
Dicken’s conceptualisation, in the current wave of technological innovations, the 
above dimensions are substantiated as in the figure below.  
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Figure -1: Kondratiev fifth long wave: Late 1990s onwards 
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This scheme allows us to recognise the technological innovations which are 
progressively more significant as sources of integration in the global political 
economy and to define the indicators used in the literature to identify the degree of 
integration of a country or region in it. There is a generalised consensus in the 
literature11 that the telecommunications revolution and the widespread use of 
internet and digital resources that facilitate not only generic communication, but 
also learning and production processes are the most significant technological 
innovations of the current phase of capitalist development.  
However, the spread in the use of ICT technologies is extremely uneven 
around the globe and amongst societal groups. Instead of producing a general 
shrinking of the time-space surface, technological innovations have exacerbated, in 
relative terms, the peripherisation of some parts of the world. The digital divide is 
therefore a reality increasingly privileging certain countries and certain social groups 
over others, especially urban spaces and big cities in the developed world (Sassen 
1991, Talani et al. 2013). Moreover, as access to communication technologies is, 
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nowadays, fundamental to acquire vital information and knowledge, its increasingly 
uneven distribution poses increasingly serious developmental problems12. 
The figures released by ITU (2013) 13  confirm the existence of a clear 
technological divide between developing and developed countries14.  
Within the developing world, Asia is the region of the world improving the 
most in terms of access to ICT technologies, accounting for more than half of all 
mobile subscriptions in 2013. As far as internet is concerned, ITU estimated that 2.7 
billion people, which is 39 per cent of the world’s population, would be using the 
internet by the end of 2013. Access to internet would however remain limited in the 
developing world with no more that 31 per cent of the population forecasted to be 
able to be online at the end of 2013, compared with 77 per cent in the developed 
world. Europe would remain the most connected region in the world with 75 per 
cent internet penetration, while Asia and the Pacific would have 32 per cent rate of 
penetration and Africa only 16 per cent15.  
Also, household internet penetration, which is often considered the most 
important measure of internet access, was forecasted to be growing, with 41 per 
cent of the world’s households connected to the internet by the end of 2013. 
However, notwithstanding the generally positive outlook, 90 per cent of the 1.1 
billion households around the world that are still unconnected are in the developing 
world.  
In 2013 two thirds of the world’s population, around 4.5 billion people were 
still offline and they were overwhelmingly in the developing world, especially 
Africa16. 
Moreover, although the cost of fixed-broadband services dropped enormously 
between 2008 and 2013, decreasing by 82 per cent if measured as a share of GNI per 
capita, in developing countries residential fixed-broadband services remained very 
expensive, accounting for over 30 per cent of average monthly GNI per capita 
compared to just 1.7 per cent of average national income in wealthy countries. In 
some developing countries, that figure rises to well over 50 per cent17. 
Also, differences in high-speed broadband internet access persist. The best 
performers in terms of access speeds were in Asia: the Republic of Korea, Hong Kong 
(China) and Japan. In Africa, on the contrary, fewer than 10 per cent of fixed-
broadband subscriptions offered speeds of at least 2Mbit/s18.  
Finally, in developing countries the gender divide was still very significant with 
16 per cent fewer women than men using the Internet, compared with only 2 per 
cent fewer women than men in the developed world19. 
As far as the MENA region is concerned, data on the use of internet divided by 
gender are very revealing. 
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Figure 2 Individuals using the Internet (from any location) by gender 
 
 
Source: ITU database as accessed on February 9, 2016 
 
Indeed, not only MENA countries have by far fewer individuals using the 
internet, but also the gender gap is much bigger. 
For example, in Egypt only 36.6% of men, ever uses internet but women who 
use internet are 31.1%. In Turkey the gender gap is almost 20% less women using 
internet and this is compared  to the US where actually more women than men use 
internet. 
Hence, the analysis of indicators relating to the usage of telecommunications 
and internet or digital resources (so-called Information and Communication 
Technology, ICT indicators) can help in establishing whether or not a country and/or 
a region is catching up with the globalisation process. 
The UN (2008) identifies 41 core ICT indicators, divided into four groups20: 
 
1. ICT infrastructure and access (12 indicators) 
2. Access to, and use of, ICT by households and individuals (13 indicators)  
3. Use of ICT by businesses (12 indicators) 
4. The ICT sector and trade in ICT goods (4 indicators). 
 
Reference is made below to some such indicators in the Arab world in general 
and in Egypt, Libya and Tunisia in particular. It is worth noting, however, that the 
author does not consider these indicators the only relevant ones to assess 
marginalisation, as symptoms of lack of integration via ICT indicators do not appear 
totally reliable. Indeed, if we look at indicators of access to technology for countries 
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such as China, these are still relatively low (although they have been improving at a 
fastest rate than anywhere else), but this cannot and does not mean that the 
country is not being increasingly integrated in the global economy.  
Given these considerations, the Arab region21 and the countries considered in 
this study are, without doubt, lagging behind in terms of access to the new 
technologies.  
With respect to the first category of indicators, ICT infrastructure and access, 
for example, the position of Egypt, Libya and Tunisia is very negative, with Tunisia 
and Egypt not reaching even 5 internet subscriptions per 100 inhabitants in 2011 
(Figure below). 
 
 
Figure -3: Fixed (wired) internet subscriptions per 100 inhabitants (A4) 
 
Source: ITU-statistics 
 
 
Even worse is the situation of the number of fixed broadband subscriptions per 
100 inhabitants in the three countries considered, with Egypt recording less than 2 in 
2010, Libya around 1, and Tunisia not reaching 5 (Figure below). 
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Figure -4: Fixed (wired) broadband subscriptions per 100 inhabitants 2010 (A5) 
 
 
Source: ITU-statistics 
 
 
 
In terms of access to, and use of, ICT by households and individuals, the latest 
data do not portray a particularly positive picture. The proportion of households 
with a computer in Egypt in 2011 was around 36 per cent and the number of 
individuals who used a computer was only 32 per cent. Only 30 per cent of the 
Egyptian population had access to internet at home as opposed, for example, to 85 
per cent of the British population. In Tunisia the situation was even worse, with only 
19 per cent of households with a computer and only 11 per cent of the population 
with access to internet at home. In the last 12 months of 2011 the proportion of 
individuals who used a computer in Tunisia was only 24 per cent and even less, 17 
per cent, used Internet, whereas in the UK this figure was 87 per cent. In Libya, the 
percentage of estimated internet users in 2010 was 14 per cent22. 
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Table 1: Core indicators on access to, and use of, ICT by households and individuals 
2010-2011 
Core indicators on access to, and use of, ICT by households and 
individuals, latest available data         
   Proportion of households 
with 
   Proportion of individuals who 
used ICTs in the last 12 months 
  Year  (HH4)  (HH6)    (HH5)   (HH7)     
    of 
latest 
data 
  Computer   Internet 
access 
at 
home 
    Computer   Internet     
61 Egypt 2011   36.4   30.5     32.4   ...     
115 Libya     ...   ...     ...   ...     
208 Tunisia 2010   19.1   11.4     24.9 ²⁹ 17.1 ²⁹ ²⁹ 
216 United 
Kingdom 
2011   84.6   85.1     ...   86.8 ⁴   
217 United 
States 
2010   75.5   71.1     ...   71.7 ²⁰   
                            
Note:      
... Data not available     
 -  Zero or quantity less than the unit shown.     
Source: ITU World Telecommunication/ICT Indicators Database.     
                 
(1) Census. (2) Survey referring to July 2010 - June 2011. (3) Population age 
15+. Survey referring to July 2010 - June 2011. (4) Population age 16-74. (5) Population 
age 7+ over the total population. (6) Population age 16+. (7) Value representative of 
electrified areas. (8) Value representative of electrified areas (9) Population age 16+. 
Survey was redesigned, therefore comparison with previous years should not be done. 
(10) Cable TV. (11) Data correspond to dwellings (not households). (12) Country 
estimate. (13) Population age 5+. (14) Refers only to radio device. (15) Population age 
10+, in the last 3 months. (16) Estimate based on the households’ survey. (17) 
Population age 20+. (18) Decrease in values confirmed by Ministry. (19) Population age 
6+. (20) Population age 3+. (21) Preliminary results of Kuwait Census 2011. (22) 
Population 3+. (23) Population age 4+. (24) Based on Ministry survey 2009. (25) May 
include households with access at any place but not necessarily ownership. (26) 
Estimate based on the number of residential fixed telephone lines. (27) Estimate based 
on the number of dial-up Internet subscriptions. (28) Estimate based on the number of 
mobile cellular subscriptions. (29) Population age 10+. (30) Preliminary. (31) Population 
age 18+. (32) Population age 15+. (33) Refers to ownership by the household. (34) 
Refers to two urban districts (Paramaribo and Wanica) where 80 per cent of population 
live. (35) In the last 6 months. Population age 14+. Survey Apr-Sep. (36) Including PDAs, 
Smart Phone. (37) All population. (38) ITU estimate based on Information and Data on 
Information and Communication Technology Report, 2010. (39) DHS 2010-2011. 
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Concerning the use of ICT by businesses, data on regions outside Europe and 
excluding OECD member countries are fairly scattered. Until 2003, hardly any 
developing economy was collecting ICT usage statistics from businesses.  In the last 
few years, more and more developing and transition economies started producing 
these statistics, yet they are mainly located in the Latin American and Caribbean 
region.  
The data provided by UN and Eurostat show a very similar picture for the use 
of ICT by businesses as that found with households; widespread use of computers 
and internet is present only in developed economies. Moreover, in developing and 
transition economies the proportion of employees using a computer or internet is 
much lower than the proportion of businesses using a computer or internet. This 
means that within businesses with ICT, not many employees regularly use it23. 
In the MENA region, some country statistics are available only for Egypt. In 
Egypt, the proportion of businesses having internet was 53 per cent at the end of 
2007, as opposed to 93 per cent in the EU 25 (UN 2008). The proportion of 
employees using computers was 18 per cent and only 10 per cent was using internet, 
whereas for the EU 25 these figures were 49 per cent and 37 per cent respectively 
(UN 2008). 
In terms of core indicators for the ICT sector and trade in ICT goods, there is no 
data available for the region and for the countries considered. However, World Bank 
indicators for Science and Technology can help understanding the situation of these 
countries with respect to the technological content of their economies (World Bank 
2013). 
Indeed, the percentage of high technology exports, i.e., products with high 
R&D intensity, such as aerospace, computers, pharmaceuticals, scientific 
instruments, and electrical machinery, is very low in the MENA developing countries, 
recorded at only 3.2 per cent. In Egypt it is almost inexistent with 0.9 per cent of 
manufacturing export while in Tunisia it is around 5 per cent. For the sake of 
comparison, China high technology exports are 27.5 per cent of total, Britain’s 
around 21 per cent and the US 19 per cent (Figure below). 
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Figure -5: High technology exports ( per cent of manufacturing exports) in 2010 
 
 
Source: Elaboration of the author on data of the World Bank website 
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/DATASTATISTICS/0,,menuPK:232599~
pagePK:64133170~piPK:64133498~theSitePK:239419,00.html as accessed on March 
15, 2013. 
 
 
 
Even more relevant to ascertain the level of technological starvation of the 
MENA countries are figures relating to the number of patents per million 
inhabitants. As the graph below shows, Egypt, Libya and Tunisia are basically 
producing no new patents at all and are therefore not contributing to technological 
progress in any significant way. 
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Figure -6: Number of patents by residents per million inhabitants-last available data 
 
Source: Elaboration of the author on data of the World Bank web-site 
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/DATASTATISTICS/0,,menuPK:232599~
pagePK:64133170~piPK:64133498~theSitePK:239419,00.html as accessed on March 
15, 2013. 
 
 
If knowledge and information are key to keeping up with the process of 
globalisation and avoiding further marginalisation, it is worth looking also at basic 
education indicators as well as indicators of the use of ICT in education. In the words 
of the Arab Human Development Report: 
 
‘A knowledge-based society is one where knowledge diffusion, production and 
application become the organising principle in all aspects of human activity: culture, 
society, the economy, politics, and private life.’ (2003:2) 
 
In Arab countries, key knowledge dissemination processes, such as education 
and socialisation, are profoundly constrained by social, economic, institutional and 
political impediments 24 . In particular, dwindling economic resources limit the 
possibility for individuals, families and institutions to acquire the epistemological and 
societal skills necessary for knowledge production.  
Despite some gains in the quantitative expansion of education in Arab 
countries in the last decades, these are still modest in comparison with other 
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developing countries and do not allow the countries to meet the requirements of a 
knowledge society25.  
For example, in 2010, the Arab World and the MENA area still had lower 
literacy levels in the total adult population than the developing countries’ average 
(Figure below). 
 
Figure 7: Adult literacy year 2010 ( per cent age 15 and above) 
 
Source: Elaboration of the author on data of the World Bank web-site 
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/DATASTATISTICS/0,,menuPK:232599~
pagePK:64133170~piPK:64133498~theSitePK:239419,00.html as accessed on March 
15, 2013. 
 
The situation is clearly worse for women, whose literacy rates in the MENA 
countries are 15% less than men, 16% less in the Arab world and almost 17% in 
Egypt, where the adult women literacy rate was only 63.5% in 2010! 
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Figure 8: Literacy rates 2010 per gender 
 
Source: World Bank 
http://databank.worldbank.org/data/reports.aspx?source=Gender%20Statistics# as 
accessed on February 9, 2016 
 
Moreover, many children still do not have access to basic education and public 
spending on education has actually declined in the MENA area from around 22 per 
cent of government expenditure in 2002 to 16 per cent in 200826.  
Looking at some indicators of the use of ICT in education, the situation of 
MENA countries is not particularly positive. In Tunisia, for example, in 2008 only 40 
per cent of schools had a telephone and around the same percentage had access to 
internet. Data for Egypt and Libya are not available27.  
In all cases, nevertheless, the most important challenge facing Arab education 
is its deteriorating quality28. In Egypt, for example a wide field survey revealed that 
mastery of the basic skills of reading and writing, and mathematics, which should be 
obtained in primary school, was exceptionally low, recorded at about 40 per cent 
and 30 per cent respectively29.  
In 2010/11, all of the Arab countries which took part in the Trends in 
Mathematics, and Science Study (TIMSS) a competition in mathematics and science 
for year 5 pupils, ended up at the bottom of the table. In mathematics, Tunisia was 
ranked 4th from the last with 359 points. As a point of comparison, Singapore was 
first with 606 points, followed by Korea with 605, Hong Kong with 602 and Chinese 
Taipei with 59130. 
Overall the data confirm that the MENA region is lagging behind in terms of 
the technological and educational requirements of entire sections of its society, 
especially women, to catch up with the process of globalisation.  
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As the development of civil society is often in the literature associated to the 
level of education, especially of women, and the use of modern technologies31 this 
might point to a certain underdevelopment of civil society and social capital in these 
countries. However this conclusion is far too superficial and a closer attention to all 
the factors influencing the evolution and characteristics of civil society is needed. To 
this we turn our attention in the next section. 
 
Women, civil society and social capital in the MENA area 
 
The notion of civil society adopted by transnationalists is mainly a Gramscian 
one. Gramsci conceptualised civil society as the primary political realm, where socio-
economic groups acquire consciousness of their interests and expectations, 
ideologies are produced and spread, and alliances formed32.  
It is in the context of civil society that the battle for the conquest of true 
hegemonic power takes place, thanks also to the fundamental role played by organic 
intellectuals. This means that any socio-economic group aspiring to take the lead of 
the state needs to gain consensus in the context of civil society by both taking care 
of the economic needs of the other socio-economic strata and convincing them 
through ideological means that the interests of the dominant socio-economic 
historic bloc coincide with the interests of society as a whole33.  
On the other hand, the idea of civil society has been associated also to the 
notion of social capital as developed nearly one century ago, in 1916, with the work 
of L. Judson Hanifan34. In the tradition influenced by the work of Bourdieu, social 
capital is defined as resources embedded in civil society and accessed and used by 
actors for action35. The broadly used conception from Coleman of social capital 
emphasises its impact at the level of community36. This conception has acquired a 
substantial heuristic value thanks to the contribution of Robert Putnam (2002:3). The 
core idea of social capital is that a person’s social assets, family, friends, associates, 
are not irrelevant in a person’s life. On the contrary, they are crucial to solve 
situations of crisis or to obtain economic or other advantages. This is not only true 
for individuals but for communities too, to the extent that the density of social 
capital in a given community can bring about material advantages and avoid or limit 
the impact of crises. In few words civil society matters, or, in Putnam’s words: 
 
‘civil society affects the health of our democracies, our communities and ourselves’37 
 
The link between social policy and social capital lies in the amount and quality 
of mutual welfare delivered informally by friends, mutual support groups and 
community (neighbourhood or identity/religious-based) associations, which adds to 
and reinforces the social service nets provided by law. Social capital represents 
communal assets produced and reproduced by inter-personal relations based on 
trust and reciprocity and sustained by solidarity norms and values, including religious 
ones, as well as (in some contexts such as family and friendship networks) by 
emotional investment. Social capital relations are by their nature inclusive rather 
than exclusive.  
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Three interrelated and cumulative dimensions of social capital are important. 
These are: bonding social capital (relationships at the basic level of the family, built 
on identity and sense of belonging), bridging social capital (relationships that tie 
together different families and neighbourhoods into a larger civic community able to 
pursue common goods and outcomes) and linking social capital (relationships that 
connect the civic community and political/policy making institutions).  
Importantly, the amount of social capital in a community is not given; it varies 
across time and space which makes it imperative to study this notion in different 
societies and different historical periods.  
How do social networks and relations matter? They matter first of all for the 
people who belong to them, providing for psychological and social comfort, but also 
for plain economic returns. This is what the economists would call ‘the internal 
value’ of social capital and it defines social capital as a private good. One classical 
example is the case of employment opportunities created by the intervention of 
friends or relatives or, more generally, ‘social connections’.  
However there is also an external value of social capital, as its existence 
provides benefits also for those who do not belong to the social networks in 
question. In the economists’ jargon, there are some positive externalities from social 
capital. For example a neighbourhood watch programme against local crime 
produces a safer environment also for those who do not take part in it. From this 
point of view, social capital represents also a public good. Even more importantly, it 
helps to solve collective action problems as it produces trustworthy relations. In 
other words, the existence of a social interaction based on trust can help people to 
act for the collective good without coercion or immediate reciprocation.  
In operative terms, scholars distinguish between a narrow and a wider 
definition of social capital38. In a narrow sense, social capital refers only to the 
networks and groups joined voluntarily by individuals and involving regular face-to-
face meetings. This could be cultural associations, religious groups or even sport 
clubs. In a broader sense, individuals can belong to social groups also by chance, or 
birth, or constraint, as in the case of a family or a social class or a neighbourhood. 
Finally in the widest meaning, social capital refers to situations where meetings are 
irregular and casual, like groups of commuters, or participants in a public 
demonstration. 
Consequently, the social cohesion of civil society can be measured at various 
levels: 
1. Within each groups and communities 
2. Between different groups and communities. 
This distinction, as well as the distinction between the narrow and the wider 
definition of social capital is especially relevant when dealing with social capital in 
Muslim-majority countries. Indeed, as further elaborated below, the most relevant 
form of social capital in these countries is narrow social capital, especially religious 
social capital (RSC). Moreover the recent evolution of civil society and social capital 
in MENA countries, especially resource-poor ones, substantiates the hypothesis that 
new forms of social cohesion have been created both horizontally, i.e. within social 
classes, and vertically, i.e., between social classes. 
Finally what is most relevant is whether social capital is created through public 
intervention or it is a completely private venture. Indeed, the relations between 
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state and civil society are very complex. The state is shaped by society, but society is 
also shaped by the state and its political institutions and legislation, as becomes very 
clear when studying MENA countries’ civil societies. Indeed, the state can also hinder 
the formation of social capital through repressive policies, as in the case of Tunisia. 
As far as religious organisations are concerned, these are generally considered 
in the literature about social capital as just another form of voluntary association39.  
Evidence shows, however, that Religious Social Capital (RSC), as represented for 
example by faith-based organisations active in civil society, plays a distinctive role 
not only in building social capital but also with respect to its wider implications, 
including political ones40. In addition, as we will see below, the Arab world is peculiar 
in the extent to which social capital is generated mainly through religious 
institutions, also due in part to the distinctive characteristics of Islam. 
Following Gramsci (1975, 1999), it is conceivable to hypothesise that the 
impact of globalisation on the Arab States considered, especially its impact in terms 
of crisis of the nation state, produced the conditions for the emergence of a new 
hegemonic historic bloc. This was based on alternative ideologies such as Islam and 
underpinned by different socio-economic alliances, namely a new alliance between 
the ‘discontented’ middle class(es) and the ‘dispossessed’ lower one41, what Harvey 
(2008)42 calls the discontented and the dispossessed43. According to the relevant 
literature,44 in the Middle East, the bulk of the middle class would be represented by 
civil servants, which are, by definition, discontented by the retreat of statist 
regimes45. This is compounded by professionals and a very limited group of small 
and medium entrepreneurs, sometimes explicitly Islamic business (Schlumberger 
2008). Indeed, most of the very small entrepreneurs would belong to the category of 
the ‘dispossessed’ lower classes. With respect to the business component of the 
middle class, both in Egypt and in Tunisia, state capital tended to ally more with 
international capital than with local small and medium capital, which was generally 
weak, according to Ayubi’s conceptualisation46.  
As noticed by Ayubi: 
 
‘The private business bourgeoisie, insofar as it was allowed to exist, became 
subservient to the State and to the requirements of state capitalism’ (2008:181). 
 
Even the heavy liberalisation policies adopted in both countries as a 
consequence of globalisation-induced economic restructuring seem to have failed to 
incorporate local private small and medium entrepreneurs not connected to the 
regimes into the system47.  
On the other hand, the dispossessed are the poor, i.e., those who do not have 
possessions and therefore are unable to access the market place to meet their basic 
needs48.  
Both strata have been increasingly marginalised by the statist regimes in 
Middle East, from the political sphere as well as also from the socio-economic and 
cultural ones49. Indeed, the latest batch of economic restructuring measures mainly 
affected the lower and middle classes50. In the words of Ayubi (2008:181): 
 
‘Marginalisation is an important phenomenon in many Third world countries, 
not only because of the large size of the lumpenproletariat but also because of the 
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dangerous phenomenon of the unemployment (or underemployment) of the 
educated’ 
 
Such marginalisation is a very important breeder of protest movements, such 
as “Political Islam”51.  
What it is hypothesised here is that, in the Arab world, especially in the Middle 
East, Islam progressively became the point of reference of those strata of civil 
society marginalised by the existing regimes: the discontented middle classes and 
the lower classes. This means that in practical terms, Islam increasingly came to 
represent their only ideology, as well as the basis of their identity and, wherever 
possible, of their social relations and networks. In other words, it became the source 
of their social capital. This might have been favoured by the ideological weakness of 
the existing power bloc, which limited its capacity to gain hegemony in civil society52. 
Thus, in this context, the impact of globalisation on civil society would be the 
creation of a new socio-economic alliance between the marginalised strata of civil 
society cemented by a common ideology, Islam. How this took place is the subject of 
the next section. 
 
 Islam and civil society  
 
The purpose of this section is to found out whether the crisis of the nation 
state as a consequence of globalisation and the lack of a regional integration project 
in the MENA area has been accompanied by a progressive re-Islamisation of civil 
society, particularly the middle and lower classes, and whether this is reflected in the 
emergence of a distinct Islamic social capital within those socio-economic groups53. 
The idea is to ascertain to what extent Islamic Social Capital and Islamic Social 
Institutions favored the decline of previously well-established political solutions, or 
whether they have been constrained by repressive policy-making54.  
Already before the outburst of the Arab Spring, commentators and experts of 
Arab politics had noticed how from the 1990s Arab societies had undergone 
fundamental changes 55 . In Egypt, for example, economic crises, economic 
restructuring and globalisation had progressively undermined the statist order 
created during the Nasserist rule. In line with our transnationalist perspective, these 
changes brought about a weakening of state control over the economy and society, 
especially the withdrawal of the public sector and the progressive demise of the 
subsidy system56. Rutherford (2008:2) notes how these transformations also eroded 
the already weak political ideology legitimating the regime, whose liberal conception 
of law within the judiciary was increasingly challenged by the Islamic conception of 
governance proposed by the Muslim brotherhood and political Islam. In a word, the 
declining statism of the regime, which was no longer sustainable given the 
constraints imposed on the state by globalisation, was increasingly challenged by an 
alternative political ideology based on Islam57. It is outside the scope of this very 
short section to discuss the economic ideology of Islam or rather the complex and 
contradictory relation between Islam and capitalism, which has been addressed 
exhaustively elsewhere58.  
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The role of Islam in society and politics is a highly debated question, not only 
between scholars, but also within Islam itself59. With respect to its basic principles, 
Islam can be considered a unified whole60. However, countless interpretations exist 
relating to secondary prescriptions as well as to the objectives of the Islamic texts, to 
the extent that experts of Muslim-majority societies generally speak about ‘Islams’ 
to underline the diversity of Islamic social and cultural contexts61.  As Ramadan puts 
it: 
 
‘What is meant by the concept of “Islamic Civilisation” is precisely this: One 
single Islam, a diversity of interpretations and a plurality of cultures’62. 
 
Political Islam does not come in a single, unified version either, although its 
origins have to be traced back to the late 19th  Century reformers who were both 
pan-Islamic and anti-colonial and had a great impact on 20th Century Islamic 
thought63. According to them, Muslims had to go back to their religious teachings, 
acquire consciousness of their subordination and free themselves from the chains of 
colonialism. From this perspective, Islam as a religion was invoked and played a 
fundamental role in the liberation from colonialism as well as in the future political, 
economic and cultural organisation of Muslim-majority states. It was however only 
with the creation of the Muslim Brotherhood by Hassan al-Banna (1906-1949) that 
what is known now as ‘political Islam’ or ‘Islamism’ acquired a much clearer 
definition. Relying heavily on the thoughts of the first generation of reformers, al-
Banna proposed early on a program of re-islamisation of Egypt64.  
Currently, Islamist movements are divided mainly on the following issues: 1) 
the definition of who is a Muslim and what are their prerogatives; 2) the use of 
violence; 3) the application of the sharia as a closed legal system or as open to 
foreign references such as democracy; 4) whether it is acceptable to create an 
Islamist political party or it is preferable to retain the status of a religious and social 
organisation; 5) the role of women in Muslim-majority societies; 6) the relation with 
people of other religion or no religion in society; 7) the relation with the West65. 
To understand the capacity of Islamism to conquer the realm of civil society, it 
is extremely important to underline that not only did it originate as a legalistic, 
societal movement, but it also never lost its original strategy of reforming society 
from the bottom-up, by educating the masses in order to change society as a whole 
and restructure the state into the Islamic State66.  
Indeed, the relationship between religion and sovereignty has always been a 
contested one in the Arab State. Even in the most advanced Islamic constitutions, 
such as the Tunisian one, moving away from the Sharia to a legal system devoid of 
theological-political influence proved extremely difficult; the legislature stipulated 
that Islam is the religion of the state. Consequently, citizens were not free to choose 
their beliefs, or lack thereof67.  
In Egypt, the re-islamisation of society and the American alliance went hand in 
hand, constituting another paradox, which is known in the literature as the Egyptian 
paradox68. The explanation might be found in the need of the regime to protect itself 
from the violent sections of the Muslim Brotherhood which attempted to 
assassinate Nasser in 1954, successfully managed to eliminate Sadat in 198169, 
almost killed Mubarak in 1995 and were increasingly gaining consensus in civil 
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society70. Indeed, although politically the Islamists had not yet won power, they 
were increasingly taking control of the social body. As Meddeb puts it: 
 
‘In the war of words, the state thought it had to take away from the 
fundamentalists the argument denouncing the non-conformity of their society to 
Islamic norms. To defuse this criticism, the state decided to entrust to Al-Azhar the 
governance of souls, provided it would minimize the reach of political Islam. After 
such a tacit agreement, society found itself metamorphosed’71.  
 
What remains to be ascertained now is how Islamism was successful in its 
endeavor to gain cultural hegemony in Muslim-majority countries, to what extent 
and why72. 
A prominent source for identifying the role of Islamists in civil society, their 
level of penetration and their capacity to substitute the state in the provision of 
public goods is represented by the Arab Human Development Reports  (AHDR), 
prepared by a team of prominent Arab intellectuals under the auspices of the United 
Nations Development Program (UNDP) between 2002 and 2009. These reports 
argued that throughout the Middle East Islamist groups had increasingly obtained 
broad popular support, had provided effective service networks and developed a 
formidable capacity to mobilise followers. 
As underlined in the AHDR of 2002 the Arab world has a very established 
tradition of religious civil society organisations based on the ‘waqf’ system73. Since 
the end of the 19th Century this led to the creation of Islamic cultural associations 
and charities which, in line with the program of political Islam, were heavily involved 
in education, provision of health care and other social and religious matters. These 
organisations, whose activities within civil society were limited if not prohibited by 
the state in the past, witnessed a strong revival later on, especially in more recent 
decades as a consequence of the increasing difficulty of the state to provide similar 
services, or, in the words of the report: 
 
‘more or less encouraged by public authorities needing their assistance in 
times of difficulty’74.  
 
On the contrary, non-religious civil society organisations encountered several 
external constraints in playing their role effectively, such as for example the 
imposition of bureaucratic constraints in the form of control of civic associations by 
public authorities75. Moreover, non-religious civic associations were considered by 
the AHDR to be dysfunctional in various ways. They lacked internal democracy, as 
demonstrated by the weak participation of women and youth and the concentration 
of power in the hands of a single individual, usually, the founder of the 
organization76. This usually led to conflicts and often splits. Moreover, they were 
seen as lacking transparency in their decision-making processes and incapable of 
settling disputes peacefully through debates. In administrative terms they were 
considered unable to respect clear-cut rules of management and accountability. All 
these shortcomings contributed to non-religious NGOs encountering many problems 
in financing their activities. On the contrary, civil associations with a religious 
background were much more successful at maintaining financial independence. This 
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was the case because they enjoyed credibility and legitimacy in society as their 
actions accorded with traditional Arab and Muslim norms of civic action, associating 
such activities with welfare and charity work. Moreover, their missions were clear 
and their social impact immediate as they satisfied pressing and sensitive needs of 
the population77. Finally they could rely on donations from the private sector under 
the form of Zakat78 as well as providing certain services for a fee.  
As underlined by the reports, this was clearly not the case with other, more 
advocacy oriented kinds of civil society organisations which provided for functions or 
services alien to, or at least not appreciated by, the society at large. They provoked 
distrust amongst private donors, entering into antagonistic relations both with civil 
society and with the authorities and having to rely heavily on finances coming from 
international donors79. This, in turn deepened public hostility towards their activities 
and increased their incapacity to communicate with domestic societal actors who 
did not contribute to their activities either through voluntary work or through 
financial help80. 
Thus, throughout the Middle East, it is almost exclusively Islamist charities and 
social welfare organisations that have played a major role in addressing the socio-
economic needs of Muslim societies.  
In some resource-poor Muslim-majority societies, this role has been increasing 
with the crisis of the nation state and has not only affected the poorer strata of 
society81. In fact, Clark (2004) demonstrates through case studies of Islamic medical 
clinics in Egypt that the Islamic Center Charity Society in Jordan, and the Islam 
Women’s Charitable Society in Yemen82, were run and served also the interests of 
the middle classes83. Hence, Islamic social institutions (ISIs) were not only a means to 
conquer the lower classes, as often underlined in the literature84, but have clearly 
been playing an increasingly essential role in providing social networks that 
strengthened the ties of solidarity amongst the different components of the middle-
class, as well as between this and the lower class. 
As clearly underlined by Clark: 
 
‘Then, as now, the middle class established nongovernmental organisations in 
reaction to state weakness’85.  
 
This also allowed for the diffusion of Islamic ideas amongst these classes, 
which produced as its outcome new social and political movements based on Islam 
as opposed to other, more secular, ideologies: 
 
‘ISIs are more than just a challenge to the State’s ability to do its job; they are a 
challenge to the secular state itself. They represent an alternative organization of 
state and society – a potentially revolutionary one – based on Islam’86.  
 
In the case of Egypt, the Muslim Brotherhood represented by far the most 
important religious civil society organisation and no doubt also the most successful 
one87.  
The creation of the Muslim Brotherhood happened in1928, just a few years 
after the demise of the spiritual caliphate exercised by the Ottoman Empire. The 
objectives of the Brotherhood were quite specific from the beginning and included a 
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return to Islam which had to be obtained through a bottom-up strategy based on 
programs of mass education, social and economic reform and progressive 
implementation of Islamic legislation. The final aim was to set up an ‘Islamic State’88. 
To achieve this new moral, social and legal order, the program conceived by Al 
Banna’ required a complete transformation of the educational system, asking, for 
example, for primary schools be attached to mosques. The formation of political 
parties was forbidden and civil servants were required to have religious training89. It 
seems clear that, from its establishment, political Islam, especially as embodied by 
the Muslim Brotherhood, had a clear agenda of conquering civil society before 
establishing an Islamic State. It defined itself not as a political party, but as solidarity-
based social and educational organisation alternative to the state90. Eventually, al-
Banna’s ideas transcended national boundaries and gained millions of supporters all 
over the Arab world91.  
Thus, the Muslim Brotherhood was from its origins a civil society organisation 
building religious social capital especially amongst the strata of society who did not 
have full access to the public goods provided by the state. A more violent 
component came to the forefront in Egypt in the early 1960s as a reaction to the 
consolidation into power of Colonel Gamal Abdel Nasser (1918-1970). The 
Brotherhood then started to include different trends, ranging from its mainly 
societal and legalistic origins to more radicalised and violent elements following 
Nasser’s repression in the 1950s and 1960s92. With the retreat of the state and the 
progressive reduction of its services to the middle classes, the reach of the Muslim 
Brotherhood as a social solidarity system has substantially increased93. This societal 
dimension, therefore, has become all the more important. If the strategy of the 
Muslim Brotherhood during the regimes of Nasser and Sadat was divided between 
violent opposition to the regime and a grassroots program of conquest of civil 
society by focusing especially on education, in the course of Mubarak’s regime, 
especially from the early 1990s, its reach became more capillary94. By 1992 the MB 
led all of the major professional associations, apart from that of journalists, and all of 
the university students’ unions. The more that the regime faced difficulties in 
maintaining control of the economy and guaranteeing even the most basic services 
in some deprived areas, the more the MB intervened and substituted the state by 
establishing Islamic schools, health clinics based on Islamic rules and values and 
credit unions95. Moreover, this alternative network of schools, hospitals and social 
services was heavily supported by the so-called ‘Islamic business sector’96. It is 
outside the scope of this discussion to identify foreign sources of financing of Islamic 
Social Institutions (Ramadan 2012; recently the Financial Times stressed the 
intervention of Qatar). 
It might be true that the Islamists and the MB abstained from taking the lead 
of the events of Midan Tahir between the 25th and the 28th of January 2011. 
However, as rightly explained by Hamid (2011a:29): 
 
For the members of Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood—the oldest and most 
influential Islamist political party—the Arab Spring may not have been entirely of 
their making, but it surely was the answer to their prayers. 
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Indeed, the leaders of the MB were careful to instruct their militants not to 
shout explicit Islamist slogans in Tahir square, to avoid the US or other western 
countries intervening to crack down on the Islamist threat. However, the 
Brotherhood made its presence during the revolts was of vital importance providing 
medical services to the protesters, protecting them from violent repression and 
keeping order97.  
Contrary to Egypt, in Tunisia the retrenchment of the state in terms of welfare 
provisions was not so marked and, because of the control of the regime on civil 
society and its repressive policies, civic groups, including Islamic groups, did not 
manage to be active on social issues98.  
In Tunisia, the Islamic political opposition, Al Nahda, was a direct product of 
the regime. In response to the growing relevance of secular civil society 
organisations, such as labour unions, student movements and other secular political 
groupings in the early 1970s, Bourguiba allowed the formation of a religious 
association for the Preservation of the Koran99. This organisation later became the 
Jamma Islamiyya and initially limited its activities to questions of faith and morality.  
However, with the economic crisis of the late 1970s, the Islamists started to propose 
a more socio-economic project, opening themselves to unions and workers100. 
Political concerns followed suit in 1980 with the establishment of the Islamic 
Tendency Movement (MTI), an Islamist political movement which was refused 
recognition from the government and heavily repressed101. The change of regime in 
1987, with Ben Ali freeing thousands of Islamists, including the leader Rachid 
Ghanoushi, brought the MTI to change its name to Hizb’ Al Nahda (the Reinassance 
Party) looking for a government recognition that never arrived. Instead, after the 
Islamists independent list won 14 per cent of the vote as opposed to 5 per cent of all 
other opposition groups combined, Al Nahda was brutally repressed by the regime 
of Ben Ali, and any other form of independent civil society activity was frozen102.  
Therefore, given the incredibly repressive nature of the Tunisian regime in 
more recent years, the Islamist movements could not be actively involved in social 
and charity activities on the ground as it had been the case for the MB in Egypt. 
Despite this, the re-islamisation of the Tunisian society was a reality for at least a 
decade before the uprising of 2011103. As the human rights activist Ilhem Abdelkifi 
pointed out: 
 
“Tunisians are religious. [Al-Nahda] will attract those who do not know where 
to go104.”  
 
Furthermore, interviews with Islamist leaders indicated globalisation and 
economic restructuring as a relevant factor in producing a return to Islam. In 
particular, Rachid Ghanoushi explicitly condemned economic restructuring brought 
about by globalisation for: 
 
‘marginalizing the most vulnerable and favouring the most powerful105’  
 
Thus, even in the case of Tunisia, where ruthless repression made it impossible 
for Islamist movements to take control of civil society and build religious social 
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capital, economic reforms and globalisation are generally recognised as the sources 
of the re-Islamisation of society in recent times106.  
As noticed by Noueihed: 
 
‘Arab leaders demonstrated a knack for “upgrading authoritarianism” to 
survive the challenges posed not only by globalisation […] One of several tactics they 
employed was to curtail, co-opt, compete with and therefore undermine efforts to 
build a strong civil society through the creation of non-governmental 
organisations’107. 
 
This was certainly the case of Libya, where Gaddafi soon after taking power 
started a policy of complete eradication of any sort of civil society structure108. 
Granted, this was somehow easier in this country than anywhere else. The literature 
is indeed consensual on tracing back the origins of the fragmentation of the Libyan 
civil society in the legacy of the Italian colonization109. The Italians were ruthless in 
their colonization efforts and tore Libyan society apart leaving little in exchange110. 
Given the way in which the Italian colonization process was carried on and, 
concluded, Libyan society did not benefit from the establishment of solid political 
institutions, an effective legal system or an education infrastructure111. However, if 
some elements of civil society are to be identified in the Libyan case, these are 
related to the spread of Islam. Already under King Idris, immediately after the 
independence, the Muslim Brotherhood managed to penetrate Libya from 
neighboring Egypt. Despite the heavy repression of its members carried on by 
Gaddafi, the Muslim Brotherhood remained active into the 1980s and 1990s. 
Although clearly a small group of mainly educated people and intellectuals, it did 
represent one of the few instances of civil society organizations in the country. 
When Gaddafi finally decided to crash it completely, at the end of the 1990s, the 
Brotherhood’s presence in Libya was much reduced, but the consequence was, as in 
other countries, the radicalization of Islam and its deeper penetration in the minds 
of Libyan people112 as the only possibility of resistance to the Dictator113.  This 
happened, however, after Libya had been politically and economically isolated by 
the West, a political economy isolation which brought to economic 
marginalization114. No doubt these dynamics will play a role in the post-Gaddafi 
Libyan political and social order, although the situation is much complicated by other 
elements such as tribal rivalries and, above all, the question of the control of oil115.  
Concluding, globalisation-induced economic restructuring, by either restricting 
the ability of the state to protect the poor and the middle classes or by causing a 
profound identity crisis in civil society through state repression, strengthened the 
hand of political Islam and undermined the legitimacy of the regimes in the 
resource-poor countries of the MENA area, including Egypt and Tunisia116.  
Such a process did not occur suddenly on the eve of the Arab Spring. In Egypt 
this was clearly the consequence of a capillary penetration of Islam in civil society 
thanks to its capacity to foster social capital and develop well-established solidarity 
networks both between lower and middle classes as well as within them (binding 
and bridging social capital, in the classification of the relevant literature)117.  
Thus, in Egypt, as well as in other resource-poor MENA countries such as 
Jordan118, and Yemen, the Islamic Social Institutions (ISIs), which were adding to the 
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creation of social capital, also created horizontal and vertical social networks of 
solidarity among the discontented middle classes and the dispossessed poor ones. 
However, these prevailing forms of social capital were based on an Islamic view of 
society and the state; they were therefore alternative to both the status quo and to 
more secular social movements. In these cases, civil society was indeed empowered 
by globalisation, as proposed by transnationalists. However, this occurred by 
favouring the creation of a distinct Islamic social capital, binding both the middle 
classes and the poorer strata of society more closely in the name of a vision of the 
state and society alternative to both the existing regimes and a more secular project. 
Islamism, as an ideology, permeated the middle and poor strata of society 
cementing a new socio-economic alliance, or, as Gramsci would put it, a new socio-
economic historic bloc119. 
Similarly, in Tunisia Islamism came to penetrate deeply into civil society and to 
represent a strong factor of cohesion between the middle and lower classes. Given 
the repressive nature of the state, which tightly controlled civil society as well as the 
welfare state, this could not happen through faith-based welfare provisions and 
religious social capital. However, by negating an evolution of civil society towards a 
model already prevailing in other Arab states, it enlarged the sources of discontent, 
especially amongst the marginalised strata of society, thus creating a vacuum which 
Islam increasingly filled. In a way, the evolutions of the Egyptian and Tunisian civil 
society (or lack of it) are the two sides of the same coin: by adopting de facto 
opposite attitudes towards the development of Islamic Social Institutions and social 
capital, the two regimes obtained exactly the same result, the empowerment of the 
Islamic ideology in opposition to both the status quo and any other alternative 
ideological/political projects.  
Thus, as the corrupted nationalistic regimes in Egypt and Tunisia failed to 
guarantee prosperity to their societies, so these same societies turned to Islamism as 
the only alternative to the status quo. These new approaches to constitutional order 
based on political Islam progressively grew into meaningful alternatives to the 
declining statism of the regimes120.  
To a certain extent, this analysis about the radicalization and penetration of 
Islam in society can be applied also to the case of Libya. However, the case of Libya, 
as an oil-producing country, requires a more detailed analysis of the political 
economy of oil. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Although some progress has been achieved in terms of increasing the 
educational attainments of women in the MENA area, their marginalization seem to 
be further warranted by the two phenomena identified in this article. On the one 
side, the lack of integration of most of MENA countries in the global political 
economy seems to be a consequence of its incapacity to catch up with the 
technological skills necessary to upgrade its productive and economic systems. If this 
is true for the general population, as clearly demonstrated in this article, it is even 
truer for women, who represent a social group increasingly lagging behind in the 
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process of up-skilling and in the acquisition of the technological expertise necessary 
to integrate in the new global economy. 
On the other hand, as a consequence of the retreat of the Middle Eastern and 
Arab State from the provision of jobs and public services, Arab societies seem to 
have undergone a process of Islamisation which penalizes especially women. 
This is related both to the need for women to provide those services previously 
offered by the State and also to the role that women are perceived to have in a more 
radicalized context, which limits women’s possibility to gain centre stage in the 
economic and public life. 
None of these two developments looks good for the future of women in the 
MENA area.  
 27 
 
Short biography: 
Leila Simona Talani is a full Professor of International Political Economy as 
well as Jean Monnet Chair of European Political Economy in the department of 
European and International Studies at King’s College London. She is the author of: 
The Arab Spring in the Global Political Economy (Palgrave, 2014), Dirty Cities 
(Palgrave, 2013), European Political Economy (Ashgate: 2014), amongst other 
publications.  
 
Address for correspondence: 
c/o Department of European and International Studies 
King’s College London, Virginia Woolf Building, 22 Kingsway  
London, WC2B 6NR 
Telephone: +44 (0) 207 848 7382 
e-mail: Leila.talani@kcl.ac.uk 
 
 
 28 
 
                                                             
1 Mittleman, J.H., (2000), The Globalisation Syndrome: Transformation and Resistance, Princeton: 
Princeton University Press; Robinson, W. (2004), A Theory of Global Capitalism: Transnational 
Production, Transnational Capitalists, and the Transnational State, Baltimore, MD: Johns 
Hopkins University Press; 
2 Mittleman 2000: 122 
3 Mittleman 2000:122-123 
4 Mittleman 2000; similarly Sassen, S., (1991), The global City: New York, London, Tokyo, Princeton 
NJ: Princeton University Press 
5 Mittleman 2000:122-123 
6 Mittelman 2000: 226; Talani ,L.,S., Clarkson, A., Pacheco-Pardo, R., (2013), Dirty Cities, London: 
Palgrave 
7 Shafik, N., (1999) Technology: A Disintegrative Factor in the Arab World, in Hudson, C.,M., (ed) 
(1999), The Middle East Dilemma, Tauris ed. P.212 
8  Arab Human Development Report (AHDR) (2003), Building a Knowledge Society, AHDR, 
available at http://www.arab-hdr.org/contents/index.aspx?rid=2 as accessed on April 5, 2013 
9 Dicken, P., (2011), (6th ed.), Global Shift: Mapping the Changing Contours of the World Economy, 
Guilford, p. 77 
10 Dicken 2011:79 
11 Dicken 2011; Strange, S., (1998), Mad Money, Manchester: Manchester University Press 
12 Dicken 2011:95 
13 ITU (2013), ICT Facts and Figures, website http://www.itu.int/ITU-
D/ict/facts/material/ICTFactsFigures2013.pdf as accessed on March 7, 2013 
14The list of the countries belonging to each regions as well as to the developing/developed world is 
based on the UN classification and is available at ITU site:  http://www.itu.int/ITU-
D/ict/definitions/regions/index.htm as accessed on March 7, 2013 
15 ITU 2013 
16 ITU 2013 
17 ITU 2013 
18 ITU 2013 
19 ITU 2013 
20 UN [United Nations] (2008) The Global Information Society: A Statistical View – Partnership on 
Measuring ICT for Development, April 2008, LC/W.190. At: http://www.itu.int/ITU-
D/ict/material/LCW190_en.pdf as accessed on March 7, 2013 
21 According to the ITU classification Egypt, Libya and Tunisia belong to the Arab World. See 
http://www.itu.int/ITU-D/ict/definitions/regions/index.htm as accessed on March 7, 2013. 
22 ITU 2013 
23 UN 2008:55 
24 AHDR 2003:2 
25 AHDR 2003:3 
26 World Bank Statistics, web-site http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SE.XPD.TOTL.GB.ZS?page=1 
as accessed on March 22, 2013. 
27 UN 2008 
28 Arab Human Development Report (AHDR) (2002), Creating Opportunities for Future Generations, 
AHDR available at http://www.arab-hdr.org/contents/index.aspx?rid=1 as accessed on April 5, 
2013, pp. 47-51; AHRD 2003:51-56). 
29 AHDR 2003: 55 
30 See http://www.educationcounts.govt.nz/__data/assets/pdf_file/0011/114995/Key-Findings-NZ-
Participation-in-TIMSS-and-PIRLS-2010-2011.pdf p:11  
31 AHDR 2003:38; Mittleman 2000 
32 Gramsci, A., (1999), Selections from the prisons' notebooks of Antonio Gramsci, (London: 
Elecbook, electronic books), 
Gramsci, A., (1975), Quaderni dal carcere, (Torino: Einaudi) 
 
33 Gramsci 1975, 1999 
34 Putnam, R., (2000), Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community. New York: 
Simon & Schuster, p. 19 
 29 
                                                                                                                                                                              
35 Bourdieu, P. (1980) Le capital social: notes provisoires. Actes de la Recherche in Sciences Sociales, 
31, 2-3. 
36 Coleman J. (1988),Social Capital in the Creation of Human Capital, American Journal of Sociology, 
Vol. 94, 95-120. 
37 Putnam, R., (2002), Democracies in flux, Oxford Scholarship online, www.oxfordscholarship.com as 
accessed on February 19, 2007, p.6 
38 Worms, J., (2002), France: Old and New Civic and Social Ties in France, in R.D. Putnam (ed) 
Democracies in Flux: The Evolution of Social Capital in Contemporary Society. New York: 
Oxford University Press, 137-188, p. 138 
39 Putnam 2000 
40 Harrigan, J. and El Said H., (2009), Economic liberalisation, Social Capital and Islamic Welfare 
Provision, London: Palgrave, p.13 
 
41 Roccu, R. (2012), ‘Of Middle Classes, Economic Reforms and Popular Revolts’, in S. Panebianco 
and R. Rossi, eds., Winds of Democratic Change in the Mediterranean?, Palermo: Rubbettino, 
61-82; 
42 Harvey, D., (2008), The Right to the City, New Left Review 53, September-October 2008 
Harvey, D., (2010), The Enigma of Capital and the Crises of Capitalism, London: Profile Books 
43 For a very good account of the definition of middle class in the Middle East see Luciani, ‘[t]he 
middle class per se has no other distinguishing feature except that it finds itself between a top 
class, comprising the elite, and a lower class, comprising the masses’ (2007: 163). See also 
Roccu 2012, Clark, J., (2004), Islam, Charity and Activism, Indiana University Press.  
Ayubi, N. (2008), Over-stating the Arab State: Politics and Society in the Middle East, London: I.B. 
Tauris 
Ayubi, N. (1991), Political Islam: Religion and Politics in the Arab World, London: Routledge 
44 Ayubi 2008:343; Clark 2004; Roccu 2012 
45 Said, M., 2007, ‘The Fall and Rise in Wage Inequality in Egypt: New Evidence from the ELMPS, 
2006’, ERF Working Paper Series, WP 0708, Cairo: Economic Research Forum, p. 6 
46 Ayubi 2008:180-181 
47 Roccu 2012; Ayubi 2008:329-357 
48 Clark 2004:11; ‘Morti di Fame’, Ayubi 2008: 179 
49 Roccu 2012; Ayubi 2008: 181 
50 Ayubi 2008:352; Heydemann, S., ed. (2004), Networks of Privilege in the Middle East: The Politics 
of Economic Reforms Revisited, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan; Roccu 2012 
51 Ayubi 2008:181-182 
52 Ayubi 2008: 399 
53 Similarly Clark 2004; Harrigan and El-Said 2009 
54Jamal., A., (2007), Barriers to democracy: The other side of social capital in Palestine and the Arab 
World, Princeton University  
 
55 Ayubi 2008; Clark 2004; Rutherford 2008: 2; Harrigan and El-Said 2009 
56  Ayubi 2008 
57 Rutherford 2008:2 
58 Tripp, C. (2004), Islam and the Moral Economy: The Challenge of Capitalism, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. Rodinson, M. (2007 [1987]), Islam and Capitalism, London: Saqi; 
59 Ramadan, T., (2012), The Arab Awakening: Islam and the new Middle East, Penguin 
60 Ramadan 2012:72 
61 Ramadan 2012: 72 
62  Ramadan 2012:74 
63 Ramadan 2012:75; similarly Clark 2004:13-14; Ayubi 1991 
64  Ramadan 2012:75 
65 Ramadan 2012:79; Snider, L. (2007), ‘The Clash of Mental Models in the Middle East: Neoliberal 
vs. Islamic Ideas’, in R. Roy, K. Denzau and T. Willett, eds., Neoliberalism: National and 
Regional Experiments with Global Ideas, London: Routledge, 206-228; 
66 Tripp 2006; Clark 2004:11-12 
67 Meddeb, H., (2008), Ambivalence de la politique migratoire en Tunisie (Paris : FASOPO, mimeo, 
2008). 
 
 30 
                                                                                                                                                                              
68 Meddeb 2008 
69 Sadat was killed in 1981 by a member of the Jihad, a militant Islamic group that had split from the 
MB in the early 1970s. Rutherford 2008:83. 
70 Rutherford 2008:20 
71 Meddeb 2008 
72 A different issue is the discussion of the role of civil society in promoting democracy in general and 
in the Middle East. For this see Blair, H. (1997) Donors, democratisation, and civil society: 
Relating theory to practice. In Hulme, D., and M. Edwards (eds) (1997), Too Close for 
Comfort? NGOs, States and. Donors. Basingstoke: Macmillan and New York: St Martins’ 
Press. 
Finkel, S.E., (2004), “Can Democracy Be Taught?”,In Journal of Democracy  
Volume 14, Number 4, October 2003 
pp. 137-151  
Hearn., J., (2000), “Aiding Democracy? Donors and Civil Society in South Africa”, in Third World 
Quarterly, Vol. 21, No. 5 (Oct., 2000), pp. 815-830 
Henry, C., and R. Springborg, eds. (2001), Globalisation and the Politics of Development in the Middle 
East, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; 
Hoogh, M. and Stolle, D., (2003), Generating social capital, London: Palgrave 
Ibrahim, S.E., (1993), “Crises, Elites, and Democratisation in the Arab World”, in Middle East Journal 
Vol. 47, No. 2 (Spring, 1993), pp. 292-305 
Huntington, S., 1991, The Third Wave: Democratisation in the Late Twentieth Century, Norman, OK: 
University of Oklahoma Press 
Krishna, A., (2002), “Enhancing Political Participation in Democracies: What is the role of social 
capital?”, in Comparative Political Studies May 2002 vol. 35 no. 4 437-460 
Letki, N., (2004), “Socialisation for Participation?”, Political Research Quarterly, Vol. 57, No. 4 
Newton, K., “Trust, Social Capital, Civil Scoiety and Democracy” in International Political Science 
Review (2001); 
Norton, A., R., (1993), “The Future of Civil Society in the Middle East”, in Middle East Journal 
Vol. 47, No. 2 (Spring, 1993), pp. 205-216 
Ottaway, M., and Carothers, T., (2000), Funding Virtue, Carnegie Endowment for Intl Peace  
73 This is a system of donations to Islamic charitable trusts. 
74 AHDR 2002:109 
75 Arab Human Development Report (2009), Challenges to Human Security in the Arab Countries, 
AHDR, available at http://www.arab-hdr.org/contents/index.aspx?rid=2 as accessed on April 5, 
2013 
76 AHDR 2002:110 
77 AHDR 2002:110 
78 Charity 
79  AHDR 2009:71 
80  AHDR 2002:110 
81  AHDR 2002:110 
82 For a thorough analysis of the middle classes in the Middle East see Clark 2004, Ayubi 2008; Roccu 
2012. 
83 Clark 2004; similarly Rutherford 2008 
84 Harringan and El-said 2009:2; Zubaida, S., (1992), “Islam, The State and Democracy”, Middle East 
Report 179:9; Roussillon, A., (1991), “Entre Al Jihad et al Rayyan”,  Modernisation et 
nouvelles forms de mobilisation sociale, Cairo: Dossiers du centre d’etudes et the 
documentation economiques, p. 45; 
Al Sayyid, M., (1993), “A Civil Society in Egypt?”, Middle East Journal 47, No.2, p. 45. 
85 Clark 2004:5 
86 Clark 2004:5-6 
87 Clark 2004 
88 Ramadan 2012:75 
89 Meddeb 2008 
90 Rutherford 2008:78; Lia, B., (1998), The Society of the Muslim Brothers in Egypt: The Rise of an 
Islamic Mass Movement 1928-1942, Reading: Ithaca Press, p. 37; Mitchell, R., (1993), The 
society of the Muslim Brothers, Oxford: OUP, p. 214-16 
91 Ramadan 2012:75 
92 Ramadan 2012:78 
 31 
                                                                                                                                                                              
93 Clark 2004:11-12 
94 Jamal 2007 
95  Clark 2004: 14-18, 42-81; Rutherford 2008 
96 Ayubi 2008:408 
97 Hamid, S., (2011)a, Islamists and the Brotherhood: Political Islam and the Arab Spring, in Pollack, 
K., (2011), The Arab Awakaning, Washington: The Brookings Institution, pp. 29-39 
Hamid, S., (2011)b, Tunisia, in Pollack, K., (2011), The Arab Awakaning, Washington: The Brookings 
Institution, pp. 111-117 
98 Harrigan and El-Said 2009:2-4; Hibou 2011 
99 Alexander, C., (2000), “Back from the Democratic brink: Authoritarianism and Civil Scoety in 
Tunisia”, Middle East Report,October-December 1997; Harrigan and El-Said 2009). 
100 Alexander 2000 
101 Harrigan and El-Said 2009:169 
102 Hibou, B., (2011), The force of obedience: The Political Economy of Repression in Tunisia, 
Cambridge: Polity Press 
103 Harrigan and El Said 2009:171 
104 Hamid 2011b:114 
105 Harrigan and El-Said 2009:173 
106 Harrigan and El-Said 2009:174; Ayubi 2008:420; Halliday, F. (2002), ‘The Middle East and the 
Politics of Differential Integration’, in T. Dodge and R. Higgott, eds., Globalisation and the 
Middle East: Islam, Economy, Society and Politics, London: Royal Institute of International 
Affairs, 42-45; Henry and Springborg 2001 
107 Noueihed, L., (2012), The Battle for the Arab Spring, Yale University Press, p. 15 
108 Kawczynski, D,, (2011), Seeking Gaddafi: Libya, the West and the Arab Spring, Biteback 
Publishing ltd 
109 Kawcinsky 2012; Simons, G., (2003), Libya and the West, Centre for Libyan Studies: Chapter 1; 
Vanderwalle, D., (2006), A history of Modern Libya, Cambridge University Press 
World Bank, (2013), World Bank website 
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/DATASTATISTICS/0,,menuPK:232599~pag
ePK:64133170~piPK:64133498~theSitePK:239419,00.html as accessed on March 15, 2013, p. 
40; Marshall, J.K., (2011), Lybia: a look into history, Thomas R. Mann Editor-Kindle edition 
110 Marshall 2011 
111 Vandewalle 2006:33 
112 Gaddafi was successful in quashing the two most prominent Islamist factions in the country, the 
Libyan Islamic Group (the Libyan branch of the Muslim Brotherhood) and the Libyan Islamic 
Fighting Group (LIFG). The latter was formed in the early 1990s by Libyan jihadists who had 
fought in Afghanistan against the Soviet Union. In the mid-1990s, the regime launched ground 
and air attacks against LIFG bases and arrested suspected sympathizers, quickly disrupting the 
group’s cohesiveness and capabilities. In 1996, in Abu Salim, Tripoli’s main political prison, 
guards killed 1,270 prisoners, many of them Islamists. This incident, more than any other during 
Qadhafi’s rule, would become one of the main rallying cries for the opposition movement that 
would eventually bring down the regime. See Al-Turk, A., (2011), Libya From Revolt to State-
Building, in in Pollack, K., (2011), The Arab Awakaning, Washington: The Brookings 
Institution, pp. 111-117 
113 Kawczynski 2011 
114 Simons 2003; Marshall 2011 
115 Marshall 2011 
116 Harrigan and El-Said 2009:1-2; Clark 2004:11-12; Hakimian, H., and Z. Moshaver, eds. (2000), The 
State and Global Change: The Political Economy of Transition in the Middle East and North 
Africa, London: Curzon 
117 Similarly Richards, A., and Waterbury, J., (1998), A political Economy of the Middle East, 
Westview Press, p. 348-350 
118 Knowles, W., (2005), Jordan since 1989: A Study in Political Economy, London: I.B. Tauris; 
119 For a convincing account of the role played by the Islamists in the events of the 25th of January 2011 
in Egypt see Hamid 2011. 
120 Rutherford 2008:2 
